ADULT AGE DIFFERENCES IN ERRAND PLANNING: THE ROLE OF TASK FAMILIARITY AND COGNITIVE RESOURCES
The abilities to plan and to follow-up on the results of a plan (such as being able to plan shopping and cooking) represent key instrumental activities of daily living and are therefore important requirements of independence in old adults (Kliegel & Martin, 2003) .
The relevance of planning has been demonstrated for a number of patient populations in which impairments in the ability to organize ones own activities, e.g., in dementia, typically result in the need for external care (e.g., Royall, 1994) . Moreover, also in normal healthy aging, it has been shown that less efficient errand planning affects delayed execution of the plan and results in pronounced forgetting of those errands (Kliegel, McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) .
Therefore, the cognitive skills involved in planning have been attracting the attention of a growing number of cognitive and developmental psychologists in the last decade (see Morris & Ward, 2005 , for an overview, and Phillips, MacLeod & Kliegel, 2005 , for a review of adult age effects on planning). However, results of previous studies that study planning as one type of problem solving with respect to age-related effects in planning performance have revealed inconsistent data (see Phillips et al., 2005; Thonton & Dumke, 2005) . While some studies report age-related declines in planning performance in problem-solving task such as the Tower of London or the Six Elements Task (e.g., Kliegel et al., 2000; Lachman & Burack, 1993) , others point to a comparable level of planning performance in young and old adults in tests such as the Multiple Errands Task (e.g., Garden, Phillips, & MacPherson, 2001; Poon et al., 1992; Smith & Baltes, 1990) .
Considering the processes involved in a planning task such as a traditional errand problem task (e.g., Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979) , one line of reasoning would predict lower planning performance in old compared to young adults. There are several cognitive processes that have been suggested to affect performance in planning tasks (see, e.g., Allaire & Marsiske, 1999; Phillips et al., 2005) : (A) In a planning task, one has to recall plenty of information. Hence, memory capacity possibly contributes to the prediction of planning performance. (B) In most planning tasks, the available planning time is limited. Therefore, speed of processing may influence planning performance. (C) To plan effectively often means to "step back" and carefully consider the provided information rather than to act spontaneously. Hence, the ability to inhibit the over-learned reactions or misleading responses to a problem as well as the interference of irrelevant information may play an important part in planning performance. These cognitive processes typically show age-related deficits (see, e.g., Craik & Salthouse, 2000) and, therefore, should produce age-related deficits in planning performance (as it is suggested by Thornton & Dumke's, 2005 , recent review on age effects in everyday problem solving which may be applied to the problem of errand planning, as typical errand planning tasks represent a type of problem that occurs in everyday life, and generating plans involves weighing up and choosing between alternative routes/orders or errands).
Other considerations, however, might suggest comparable performances of old and young adults in planning tasks. Generally, deficits in some cognitive processing domains do not necessarily predict an overall cognitive deficit. For example, Salthouse (1984) reported that despite some cognitive deficits, old typists showed typing performance comparable to young adults as they were able to compensate for declining psychomotor speed by being able to further looking ahead in the material to be typed.
More generally, across the lifespan, older adults acquire considerable experience in planning, for example in scheduling several errands during the course of the day (as Martin & Ewert, 1997 , have shown in a real-world planning task requiring participants to plan a holiday trip). Therefore planning performance may be relatively preserved in old age despite possible declines in some cognitive processes related to planning performance (e.g., Garden et al., 2001 ). Accordingly, a recent meta-analysis of prospective memory tasks, which require the planning and execution of an intention to carry out a task (Henry, MacLeod, Phillips & Crawford, 2004) indicates a substantial age-related deficit in plan execution on laboratory tasks, but an age-related benefit of the same magnitude in plan execution in naturalistic tasks.
Thus, it seems possible that age-related planning performance can be explained by differences in (cognitive) processes required for the planning tasks, depending on the familiarity of the elements of the task to be planned (see, e.g., Collins, Luszcz, Lawson & Keeves, 1997; Denney, 1990; Diehl, Willis & Schaie, 1995; Patrick & Strough, 2004; Willis, 1996 for similar considerations of the importance of task familiarity and relevance in the everyday problem-solving literature).
Most recently, Phillips, Kliegel and Martin (in press) have reported initial experimental evidence for this proposal using two established neuropsychological computerized planning procedures. In their study, age-related performance in the Tower of London planning task (TOL; Shallice, 1982) was compared with performance in the Plan-aday task (PAD; Funke & Krüger, 1993; Kohler, Poser, & Schönle, 1995) , a task which is used to investigate more contextualized planning and which is based upon classical "daily errands" tasks (e.g., Berg, Johnson, Meegan & Strough, 2003; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979; Margrett & Marsiske, 2002) . While there were reliable age differences in the laboratorybased TOL, which could mostly be explained by age differences in processing speed, there were no significant age differences in the PAD, which was mostly related to participants' educational level. Phillips et al. (in press) concluded that these data might indicate that on planning tasks that deal with contextualized materials, old adults may be able to compensate for age-related declines in processing speed through utilization of relevant knowledge.
However, this issue has not been previously addressed by directly manipulating the familiarity of task features in one planning procedure. Guided by the considerations developed above and particularly resting on the hypothesis that in real-world situations old adults may be able to compensate for age-related declines in processing resources through utilization of relevant knowledge acquired through task-related experience, we implemented the following experimental strategy to address this issue. First, we tested age-related performance in an errand planning task manipulating its surface structure in order to comprise task elements that approximate participants' real-world errand planning experience or contain novel, unfamiliar material. Second, the cognitive mechanisms that might underlie age differences in planning performance were assessed, i.e., general memory capacity, speed of processing, inhibition, and memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features. The latter was chosen because, using a shopping list task, Ewert and Martin (1993; see also Martin & Ewert, 1997) have shown that focusing on relevant information and ignoring irrelevant information is an important process in planning. Moreover, they speculated that older adults may be able optimize their planning performance by selecting task-relevant information. Thus, we aimed to explore if the efficiency of this process in-or decreases in old age and if it reflects a possible way of optimizing ones planning performance.
We evaluated several predictions. (1) We anticipated a significant interaction between age group and planning task type, with an advantage for young adults (relative to old adults) on the unfamiliar planning task, but no age differences on the real-world planning task. (2) Further, we predicted that the age differences for the unfamiliar planning task would be reduced by covarying measures of memory, speed or inhibition. (3) For the real-world planning task, we explored the role of focusing on task-relevant information as a process potentially associated with old adults' preserved real-world planning.
Methods

Participants and design
In this study, 52 young (M = 25.6; SD = 5.3; range: 19-40) and 52 old (M = 70.9; SD = 6.2; range: 60-84) adults took part. There were no significant cohort or condition differences concerning gender (younger adults: 18 female; older adults: 19 female) and level of education (younger adults: M = 14.2 years of formal education; SD = 1.6; older adults: M = 13.7; SD = 2.4). All participants were Caucasian. The young adults were undergraduate students. The old participants were community dwelling adults who volunteered for the present experiment.
The study had a 2 (age: young versus old adults) x 2 (planning task features: real-world versus artificial) between subjects design. Twenty-six participants of each age group were allocated to one of the two planning conditions.
Measures and procedure
Planning. At first, we applied a planning measure derived from the errand planning task introduced by Bisiacchi and colleagues (see Bisiacchi, 1996; Bisiacchi et al., 1998 , for more details). In general, participants' task is to plan a sequence of six errands. Parts of the material are presented in the Appendices A and B.
(a) Version A (real-world) . For this task version, following Bisiacchi et al., participants were presented with a town map of the area in which they were to run the six errands, which included paying an electricity bill, withdrawing money from the bank to pay the bill, visiting a friend in the hospital, getting holiday pictures to show the friend in the hospital, buying a birthday present for a nephew, and getting medicine for oneself. They were asked to produce a plan for completing as many of the six errands as possible, using the shortest possible route. The participants' task here is to sequence errands, to time actions, and to logically order goals (e.g., they must recognize that they first need to go to the bank in order to withdraw the money that they will need to pay a bill, which follows in another step).
Moreover, they were given some constraints concerning the setting in the task: the time of starting and when they had to be back at home, opening hours of some shops or offices, and distances (in minutes) between several places. In addition, the map, the distance information, and the instruction contained more information than needed -i.e., irrelevant places or, for example, the reason why the friend is in the hospital. After the task was explained, participants had 10 minutes to prepare their plan. They had to write down their plan in list form on a prepared answer-sheet. The quality of the plan was scored in accordance to Bisiacchi's original scoring scheme (1996) considering besides the number of planned errands also the avoidance of errors (such as paying the bill before having withdrawn the money or disregarding opening hours; see also Bisiacchi et al., 1998 , for more details).
(b) Version B (artificial).
Here, participants had to work on an errand planning task that was parallel to version A, but transferred the setting as well as the errands and task constraints into an unfamiliar, novel setting. Structurally, however, it was isomorphic to version A. In fact, all instructions of the planning task were analogous to version A. Only the surface features were modified to fit the unfamiliar setting: Participants' task was to plan a sequence of six errands. However, in this experiment the errands to be planned included paying your taxes at planet A (version A: paying an electricity bill), withdrawing gold from planet B to pay the taxes (version A: withdrawing money from the bank to pay the bill), visiting a politician at planet C (version A: visiting a friend in the hospital), getting documents to show the politician (version A: getting holiday pictures to show the friend in the hospital), buying a birthday present for the 200 th birthday of a nephew (version A: buying a birthday present for a nephew), and getting medicine-plants for oneself (version A: getting medicine for oneself). Again, participants were presented with a map of the scene (here: an outer space section) and information regarding the task constraints. Participants were asked to produce a plan for completing as many of the six errands as possible, using the shortest (possible) route.
Again, the map, the distance information and the instruction contained more information than needed -i.e., places irrelevant for the task at hand or, for example, the reason why the politician is at the specific planet (version A: why the friend is in the hospital). After explaining the task, participants had 10 minutes to prepare their plan. They had to write down their plan on the same prepared answer-sheet as in version A. Parts of the material are presented in the Appendix B.
Memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features. Next, we assessed memory for relevant versus irrelevant features of the planning task. The object of interest here is the allocation of resources to relevant and to ignore irrelevant information and we closely followed the previously developed procedure used by Martin and Ewert (1997) . After having finished the planning task, participants were asked 10 questions by the experimenter about relevant information of the planning task (e.g., both versions: What did you have to buy for your nephew?) and 10 questions about irrelevant information (e.g., version A: Where on the map is the school?; version B: Where on the map is the planet P?). Relevant information is defined as information that is needed to perform the planning task. Both types of information were visible during the entire planning task, but not during the time participants had to answer these 20 questions. Before and during the planning task, the participants were not told that there would be questions about the planning task. The number of correct answers to irrelevant questions was subtracted from the number of correct answers to relevant questions.
The relation between correct recalled irrelevant and relevant information has been proven to be a reliable indicator of the allocation of resources to task-relevant elements in errand planning tasks (Ewert & Martin, 1993; Martin & Ewert, 1997) .
Cognitive variables. In a second part of the session, several cognitive measures were administered: memory capacity, speed of processing, and inhibition. The study material for the memory test was action phrases ("to drive a car"; cf. Engelkamp, 1991 A traditional color-word version of the Stroop-task (cf. Stroop, 1935 ; for applications cf. Houx, Jolles, & Vreeling, 1993 ) was used to measure inhibition (e.g., Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 1996) . In this task, the word stimuli consisted of four color names (red, blue, green, The digit-symbol subtask of the Wechsler-Adult-Intelligence-Scale was administered as the measure of speed of processing (revised version; Wechsler, 1981) . After the introduction and an practice phase of 7 items, the participants started and were stopped after 90 seconds by the experimenter. Speed was assessed by the number of correct symbols.
Results
We first conducted a 2x2 between subjects ANOVA on planning performance with age (young versus old adults) and planning task version (real-world versus artificial material) as factors (see Table 2 , first row). After testing for age differences in cognitive resources (Table 1) , we then investigated the influence of potential underlying cognitive mechanisms by conducting separate analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) for each of the following covariates: memory capacity, speed of processing, inhibition, and memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features (see Table 2 , rows 2 -5; see Kliegel, Phillips, Lemke, & Kopp, 2005 , for a similar analytical approach).
Effects of age and task version on planning performance.
The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of age group on planning performance indicating that the young adults showed better planning performance than the old adults (M young = 7.75, SD = 1.70 versus M old = 6.46, SD = 1.82; for the F-values and effect sizes see Table 2 ). This age effect was qualified by a significant age x task version interaction, indicating that this age effect only emerged in the artificial task version (M young = 8.51, SD = 1.55 versus M old = 5.90, SD = 1.68; t(50) = 5.83, p < .01). In the real-world task condition, there was no significant age effect (M young = 6.98, SD = 1.51 versus M old = 7.02, SD = 1.82; t(50) = -.08, n.s.). The main effect of task version was not significant.
Age differences in cognitive variables. Before covarying cognitive resources, singlefactor analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed to determine if there were reliable differences between young and old adults on the individual difference measures of memory capacity, speed of processing, and inhibition. As summarized in Table 1 , there were robust age differences in all three cognitive variables, indicating better performance in young adults.
Because memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features was assessed in the specific context of each planning task version, this measure was analysed using a 2(age) x 2(task version) between-subjects ANOVA. There were no significant main effects of age or task version on memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features, both F's < 1. More importantly, a significant interaction indicated that in the more familiar task, old adults did better than young adults in remembering relevant questions in relation to irrelevant questions Table 2 , second row). However, when covarying speed of processing ( Table 2 , third row) and when covarying inhibition ( Table 2, forth row), the main effect of age group disappeared. In contrast, in both ANCOVAs, the age x task version interaction remained significant. Finally, when covarying memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features, the opposite picture emerged. Here, the main effect of age remained but the age x task version interaction was no longer significant.
Discussion
The existing literature on age effects on planning performance reveals an inconsistent pattern. While some studies report age-related declines in planning tasks, others point to a comparable level of planning performance in both young and old adults .
We hypothesized that these results might reflect the fact that though planning is generally a very resource demanding task, under certain familiar circumstances, old adults might be able to perform near the level of young adults (as it is discussed in the everyday problems solving literature; Willis, 1996; Thornton & Dumke, 2005) . Directly testing this assumption in the present study, several interesting and somewhat novel findings emerged.
A central finding of the present study is that age differences in the planning task only emerged in the version containing unfamiliar, artificial task elements. With an isomorphic task version that contained real-world task elements, significant age effects in planning performance did not emerge. This is line with previous work, e.g., by Garden et al. (2001) and Phillips et al. (in press ) who also report differential age-related deficits in planning tasks but the current paper extends those results by keeping the structure, format, and difficulty of familiar and unfamiliar planning tasks identical, while only varying the novelty of content.
This finding suggests that in the more familiar planning task old adults may have been able to compensate for their cognitive deficits; but no such compensation might have occurred in the planning task containing artificial task elements. We will elaborate on this issue below.
A second relevant finding concerns the role of cognitive resources in age-related planning performance. Memory capacity did not seem to be an important factor of influence in the present errand planning task. This appears to be plausible as the planning task material was always present during task performance and had not to be memorized in order to perform the task. In contrast, speed of processing and inhibition were revealed to be associated to the obtained age effect in planning. This is in line with previous findings on the effect of speed of processing (e.g., Salthouse, 1993) and inhibition (e.g., Zacks & Hasher, 1994) on age-related cognitive performance in general, indicating that not age per se but age-related decrements of basic cognitive processing resources such as speed and inhibition are related to age deficits in more complex cognitive tasks.
The third important finding is that the interaction between age and task version was only eliminated by memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features -note that general memory capacity did not have this effect. Thus, although this does not reveal a direct causal link between memory for relevant task features and age-related planning performance, the interaction between age and task familiarity could be related to old adults being better in memorizing relevant task aspects and to inhibiting irrelevant task information in the familiar task only. Considering that young people showed both better selective retention and better planning than old participants in the artificial task version, one might argue that young adults might have more experience with rather artificial science-fiction-like space environments.
However, even then, the hypothesis that familiarity favors planning performance still seems to be a plausible explanation. One could additionally argue that, besides in familiarity, the two tasks also differed in the formality of the relationships (e.g., items involving a friend versus a politician). 2 The latter factor may be a separate influence upon performance, but should presumably act in the same direction. Future work on the tasks applied will have to directly examine these issues. Another potential limitation might be that older adults might have worked on the artificial planning task with less motivation than on the real-world planning task. Post-hoc interviews as well as pilot data with both versions clearly indicated that is at least very unlikely as in both task versions participants were asked "to solve a tricky problem"
and were eagerly trying to do so. Finally, one might argue that the measure of memory for relevant versus irrelevant information is heavily dependent on overall memory ability.
However, previous work (Ewert & Martin, 1993; Martin & Ewert, 1997) has repeatedly demonstrated this measure to be an effective tool to assess inhibitory efficiency in planning task. Moreover, as indicated, overall memory capacity did not substantially influence any effect revealed by the initial ANOVA, especially not the age x familiarity interaction, unlike the irrelevant / relevant memory scores. Finally and importantly, a close post-hoc inspection of the individual data for memory of relevant and irrelevant information showed that there was no individual who obtained a low discrimination score through having almost perfect recall for both relevant and irrelevant with the maximum recall for irrelevant information being 5 out of 10. In sum, these observations are in line with the conclusion that this measure is at least related to a person's selective resource allocation for relevant versus irrelevant task information. Nevertheless, more direct ways of assessing selective resource allocation to relevant task information (e.g., through measuring inspection times for distinct information aspects) are clearly needed in future studies to confirm the present finding.
Taken together, these results have several implications. Most importantly, the results can be interpreted to indicate a compensatory process in cognitive development in late life and suggest at least parts of its underlying mechanisms. Thus, data are in line with models of successful cognitive aging which underscore the effectiveness of compensatory processes in the elderly (e.g., . In line with these models, in the present study, selection of relevant information appeared as a potential compensatory process that emerged when old adults were faced with real-world cognitive materials. Further studies will have to confirm that it is truly older adults' level of experience with real-world planning scenarios (e.g., by directly assessing individual differences in the level of experience) that is underlying this effect. Considering the structure of the memory for relevant versus irrelevant task features measure, however, the data seem to reveal an example of how old adults might selectively compensate. Again, it remains to be directly tested if individuals actually perceived the irrelevant task information as being irrelevant. Nevertheless, the present study clearly demonstrates that confronted with a complex but rather familiar task structure, old adults appeared to be able to utilize those parts of information that are essential for solving the real-world planning task.
With respect to the label compensation, one could argue that the present data do not indicate that old adults consciously applied information selection as a deliberate strategy to compensate for their cognitive deficits and, therefore, the observed results do not reflect compensational processes. However, both Dixon and Bäckman's (1995) and Salthouse's (1995) concepts of compensation agree on the fundamental issue that compensation does not necessarily require that the individual is aware of the deficit and takes deliberate action to compensate. Rather, Bäckman and Dixon (1992) state that "compensation can be inferred when an objective or perceived mismatch between accessible skills and environmental demands is counterbalanced (either automatically or deliberately)" (p. 272). A more direct test of these conclusions, of course, would be an intraindividual, within-subjects design, explicitly manipulating the application of potential counterbalancing mechanisms in reaction to a mismatch. However, the present data are at least consistent with the suggested conclusions and, therefore, may serve as an impetus for future research in this direction.
Finally, with respect to the everyday problem solving literature, data indicate that on a cognitively challenging everyday problem older adults may perform just as well as younger adults. On a first view this result seems to be in contrast with Thornton and Dumke's (2005) meta-analysis on everyday problem solving that reveals that older adults on average perform more poorly than younger adults. However, Thornton and Dumke (2005) also acknowledge that on the level of specific tasks "findings regarding the effectiveness of everyday problem solving in aging are highly discrepant" (p. 85). Moreover, one of the two major theoretical approaches regarding how age may impact everyday problem-solving explicitly emphasizes the importance of experience and accumulated knowledge structures in maintaining adult cognition (Marsiske & Willis, 1995) . In consequence, for example, Baltes (1993) argues that to the extent that the problems faced are routine everyday problem solving may be preserved with age. Summarizing the considerations discussed above, the present study might just represent an example of such a real-world problem, additionally revealing a potential process (i.e., information selection) associated with the observed age invariance.
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